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VAN TIL ON AUTONOMY
Stephen T. Franklin
I had been aware of Van Til’s name for many decades, but his theology remained
obscure. While committed to many of the central emphases of classical Reformed thought
— Calvin, Knox, and Edwards were my first real theological mentors — I confess that
I knew little about contemporary Dutch/American conservative Reformed theology.
John Frame’s work on Cornelius Van Til1 provides us with a helpful, comprehensive,
authoritative, and, at least in my case, much-needed guide into this corner of the
theological world.
The theology of Van Til and his successors may be only a corner of the larger
world, but it is no backwater. It continues to guide significant portions of the Protestant
pastorate in conservative Reformed churches. Despite Van Til’s reputation as an ultra-
conservative, he weaves together pre-Enlightenment themes with surprisingly postmodernist
ones. While Van Til’s language is often highly contentious, his basic method keeps
faith with his Reformed and Augustinian heritage — far more than theologians outside
his circle of disciples might think. And while he is fully committed to Scriptural
revelation as the never-failing foundation of both practical Christianity and academic
theology, his arguments for that foundationalism are surprisingly contemporary.
Those arguments exhibit many links to what we now call postmodernism. Using
Frame’s work, I want to explore how Van Til’s theology can deepen our understanding
of the current theological enterprise.
To journey with Frame as he reviews Van Til’s work throws an intense spotlight
on the status of theology in the late 20th Century. It also reveals some unintended links
between Van Til and Barth and other more “modern” Reformed theologians. When
feuding folk discover they share a common ancestry, both sides may be offended by the
news. Both Van Til and Barth carry the genes of their Reformed ancestry. Given his
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harsh criticism of Barth, Van Til certainly never intended to ally his theology with Barth’s,
nor I suspect did Frame write this book to reveal those links. Nonetheless, they exist.
As a test-case, I will deal with the issue of human autonomy. Van Til is against it,
and here he is definitely pre-modern (but not much different from Barth). I am for it,
seeing it as one of the most precious — but also most dangerous — contributions of
biblical Christianity to the world. Whether or not he and I flatly contradict each other, I
do not know, because it is difficult to unpack all the nuances of his position. Van Til
prefers to use rich and suggestive but rather hard-to-pin-down metaphors. But what is
absolutely certain is that he and I would at least place the emphasis on different
syllables when discussing autonomy.
To present a highly complex set of issues as clearly as possible, I will present Van
Til’s theology in a expository format, into which I will interweave (A) my critique of
his position and (B) elements of my own vision. I will then return to the issue of autonomy
and the role of metaphors in shaping any systematic presentation of the Christian faith.
I want to make one more preliminary comment about Van Til’s use of language
because it reveals his theological commitments. Van Til depends heavily on metaphors2
to express his theology, begging the reader to make an imaginative leap of understanding.
Creative writers often appeal to metaphor because a literal use of words can glue us
into well-established, well-worn modes of thought — the very modes of thought from
which the writers want to unstick us. With the passage of time, a new metaphor can
turn into a work-a-day, literal usage as people “get” its message. Nonetheless, it seems
to me that many of Van Til’s basic metaphors cry out for further clarification, either in
terms of previously established “literal” terms, or in terms of other metaphors where
the new metaphors, taken as a group, define each other and create their own domain of
“literal” discourse.
I have in mind such basic themes in Van Til’s theology as “Self-contained Fullness”
and “Absolute Personality.” His God is both a “Self-contained Fullness” and at the same
time an “Absolute Personality.”3 Even when we attend to just one motif by itself, it is
not self-evident what Van Til had in mind. What does self-contained add to the notion
of fullness when referring to God? And what makes God’s personality absolute? But
Van Til combines both motifs in describing God. They obviously stand in considerable
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tension with each other. A “self-contained fullness” would seem an odd description of a
healthy “personality,” whether divine or otherwise. This may be a creative tension that
points to two different but supplementary truths that we do not ordinarily conjoin; it
may be an apparent contradiction in need of further reflection into order to grasp its
valid meaning; or it may be a straightforward logical contradiction in which each
statement falsifies the other.
I presume that Van Til would not view these two motifs as falsifying each other.
But Van Til would probably hesitate before trying to “harmonize” them. He thinks
both themes are biblical and that neither is more basic than the other. Of course we
may have good reason to suspect that Van Til was alerted to the significance of “Self-
contained Fullness” by his theological heritage. And Van Til’s doctoral advisor at
Princeton was A. A. Bowman, “whose sympathies were also with idealism and the
developing ‘personalist’ movement.”4 Surely this alerted him to the importance of
“Absolute Personality,” even if he, in his typically antagonistic style, declares the views
of the Personalists to be impersonalistic!5 But perhaps Van Til would be quite content
to admit (if in fact it is true) that it was not the Bible that first alerted him to the
significance of these ideas. Rather, what counts in his mind is that the Bible teaches
both. Therefore, we should submit to the authority of the Bible and assert both, letting
the Bible define their content in whatever way pleases God.
This brings us to Van Til’s real concern. The Bible as God’s revelation judges us;
we don’t judge God. We must avoid adjusting the biblical message to meet our precon-
ceived “standards.” Rather we must adjust our thoughts, philosophy, logic, and language
to meet God’s standards. While Barth would probably have hesitated at Van Til’s quick
identification of the biblical text with God’s objective revelation, nonetheless the two
theologians stand shoulder-to-shoulder in demanding that we adjust our human standards
to God’s revelation and not the other way around. The genes of Augustine, Anselm,
and Calvin will out!
—————
Van Til holds that God is the creator of all that is and that the basic division in
biblical doctrine is not, for example, between the natural and the supernatural but
between God and creation. The doctrine of creation implies, according to Van Til, that
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both the Christian and the non-Christian live, think, and feel as dependent on God. The
only question is whether human beings acknowledge their created status and whether
their philosophy, religion, science, reason, and culture recognize the God who has
created them and continues to sustain them. This is classic Christianity that Wesley,
Luther, Aquinas, Augustine, and St. Paul would affirm without hesitation or reservation.
Van Til further argues that sin has corrupted our view of the Creator of heaven
and earth. At best, therefore, we can have only a very inadequate understanding of
that Aboriginal Power out of which “we live and move and have our being.”6 I firmly
agree with Van Til on this point, as would Wesley, Luther, and the rest. Therefore the
non-Christian fails to grasp — intellectually, morally, religiously, and practically —
that Reality out of which we all live, including non-Christians.
In what, however, does this non-Christian failure to grasp its own foundations
consist? Is the failure total? Is it partial? Does it apply in some areas but not in others?
Does it stem from the incapacity of the unbeliever or does it result from some fundamental
flaw in the evidence? To give Van Til’s answer(s) to these questions, it is essential to
focus on one of Frame’s often-repeated comments about Van Til. According to Frame,
Van Til tended to think in terms of “systems,”7 that is, in terms of gestalts, dynamic
wholes, and even (to use a metaphor of my own) soap bubbles. This may reflect Van
Til’s early studies in Idealistic Philosophy.8
I will put the issue in my own terms: a system of doctrine or ideas is like a soap
bubble. To make this concrete, think back to that nice big bubble you noticed on your
arm this morning when you took your shower. If you touch the bubble, however
slightly, at any one point, the bubble instantly shifts. You can see the movement in the
changing patterns of color in the bubble. Each atom in the bubble moves to a different
place, and the pattern of energy/force sustaining the bubble completely reorganizes
itself. Try touching it a second time, in a different place. As long as you don’t pop the
bubble, the atoms all shift again and the energy/force reorganizes itself into yet
another pattern, with yet another beautiful display of shifting color. A system of
doctrines, whether theological, philosophical, or scientific, is like a bubble: touch any
doctrine (that is, put a stress on the system), and the whole doctrinal pattern changes.
Vary the meaning of any one doctrine, and you have changed the meaning of every
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other doctrine.
As I understand Van Til, any sin or any heresy that enters into our understanding
at one point will change our understanding at all points. Thus there is no point at
which the non-Christian has a true, wholesome, and correct understanding. This
applies not only to the unbeliever’s view of God, but to science, mathematics, and
anything else that is a part of a human life and/or worldview. Let me add that, although
this needs to be balanced by other factors that I will soon discuss, I am still in agreement
with Van Til’s argument.
Van Til’s argument has one profound implication that he forcefully and repeatedly
draws out. It is always possible to employ the method of antithesis with the non-
Christian’s life, thought, emotions, worldview, ethics, politics, science, or whatever. The
unbeliever literally does not possess even one completely true thought! Whatever the
non-Christian says is “Wrong!” — at least in the sense of not being one hundred
percent right. Thus the Gospel comes in “total” opposition to the sinner. This is simply
an application to the “philosophy of knowledge” of the traditional Protestant doctrine
of “total” depravity, which states that there is no place in the unbeliever’s life/thought
from which to begin the “long march” to salvation or to acceptance before God.9
Bootstrapping won’t work as a basis for knowledge any more than it does as a basis
for salvation. This same point can be stated a little less dramatically: there exists no
place in the unbeliever’s life or thought that is free from sin and from which the unbeliever
could begin the process of creating an unsullied knowledge of God, the world, or self.
The Gospel stands in antithesis, therefore, not merely to “works-righteousness” but to
our “works of knowledge.” Van Til forcefully and repeatedly uses this principle of
“antithesis.” This emphasis makes Van Til’s theology irritating to many people, especially
those who prefer to build bridges rather than walls. His strong commitment to the
principle of “antithesis” may have also soured some of his personal relations.10
Let me note two fundamental presuppositions of all idealist epistemologies. It
seems to me that Van Til’s theology requires these presuppositions, perhaps in a
modified form, if he is to be consistent. These presuppositions, again in a modified
form, have become “stock in trade” in our current postmodern epistemologies. The
first presupposition is that meaning is contextual. Second, truth is contextual. To
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figure out what Van Til is up to, we have to understand these two points. Neither is
particularly difficult to grasp, though their explanation may be a bit on the dull side.
Consider any sentence, which for convenience we will call sentence S. Part of
what “S” means depends on what other sentences are also asserted (or would be
asserted if asked, etc.). For example, if I say, “Water is composed of two parts of
hydrogen (by volume) to one part of oxygen,” the meaning of the sentence will depend
on how we define “hydrogen” and “oxygen.” Most of us today, when pressed for the
definitions of “hydrogen” and “oxygen” would start talking about such scientific terms
as “element,” “molecule,” “electron,” “proton,” etc. Thus the meaning of “Water is
composed of two parts of hydrogen to one part of oxygen” depends on the scientific
system in which it is embedded. Get rid of the scheme that includes elements, molecules,
protons, and atomic bonds, and you profoundly change the meaning of the sentence.
To get another, perhaps more telling example, let S now stand for “The sun also
rises.” The meaning of that sentence will depend at least partially on the associated
astronomy. If I hold that the earth is the center of the universe and that the sun circles
the earth, then S is a quite literal description of an actual state of affairs. But if I hold to
the view that the earth circles the sun, then the meaning of “The sun also rises” is
much more of a metaphor and describes, if it describes anything at all, a merely
apparent state of affairs. The meaning of the sentence then depends at least partially
on its contextual statements and, eventually, on the worldview in which it is embedded.11
The illustration of “The sun also rises” shows that not only meaning but truth
also is contextual, at least in part. Understood as a “literal statement,” S is true on an
earth-centered cosmology but false on a non-earth-centered cosmology. Understood as
a metaphor, describing only an apparent state of affairs, it could be true on either
cosmology. But it seems to me that a speaker or writer would be unlikely to assert S as
a metaphor if that person held to an earth-centered worldview.12
—————
Let me move to my first disagreement with Van Til. At least I think it is a disagree-
ment, although it may be more a matter of emphasis. Let us grant Van Til, for the
reasons just given, that sin and error13 can and do corrupt all systems of doctrine,
philosophy, science, etc. It seems to me, however, that is just one side of the story. I
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would also hold that goodness and truth can and do permeate all such systems.14
While no system is wholly true (as Van Til would stress), neither is any system wholly
wrong (as I would stress).
While one might be tempted to say that my position is quite obvious and needs
no defense (I at least am tempted to say this), there are some significant issues at stake
that need to be put on the table. In deference to Van Til’s belief that theology takes
precedence over philosophy, I will start with the theological side of the issue, and I will
start with a point on which all traditional theologians would agree. The Bible says that
God has provided us with evidence concerning his goodness and nature. This evidence
is sufficiently available to each person to make that person responsible for responding
properly. Thus whoever misuses that evidence is guilty of sin against God. While there
may be some level at which a human being may be genuinely “ignorant” of God, at this
most basic level — the level at which we are all sinners before God — no one can claim
ignorance. It is significant, it seems to me, that St. Paul does not merely say the evidence
is “available” to the sinners; he adds they actually “knew” God and are therefore “without
excuse” (Rom. 1:21). I take this to mean that the universal misuse, suppression, distortion,
and repression of the divine evidence implies that the evidence has in some sense
entered into the life and knowledge of every person.15 Of course Paul adds that humans
have repressed and distorted what they “knew” and thus in another sense they don’t
“know” God (I Cor. 1:21). Paul, gives us a deeply truthful description of the human
condition: we mix truth and error, even about God. So we are sinners who “don’t know”
God adequately or fully; but at the same time enough truth remains in us to say that
we “do know” or “did know” God and so are responsible for our sin.
So far, however, we have only established the non-controversial claim that clear
evidence for the nature of the true God enters into the life and knowledge of an individual.
Van Til would agree. The real question is: how do we move from there to the far more
contentious claim that a dimension of truth and goodness pervades all portions of that
individual’s knowledge? It seems to me that it follows from exactly the same argument
that led us to the conclusion that a dimension of perversity and evil pervades all
portions of our knowledge. That is, it follows from the claim that meaning and truth
depend, at least in part, on their context. Once God’s goodness enters into our knowledge,
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then it becomes a part of the context with which we understand all other aspects of our
knowledge. This knowledge of God’s goodness need not be explicit or even conscious.
It may well remain in that penumbra of repressed truth, forgotten facts, and half-
conscious memories, where most of our knowledge resides.16 But as long as the knowledge
of God’s goodness enters into our souls and minds, no matter how dimly, it will have its
impact on the rest of our knowledge and, perhaps more importantly, on our hearts. In
short, the goodness of God impacts the whole of our knowledge and being, it balances
the evil that also permeates that same knowledge and being, and it results in that mixture
of good and evil, truth and falsity, that characterizes all human life and knowledge.
Before moving to the next section, I want to show how our discussion impacts
practical questions of Christian ministry. When evangelists tell unbelievers about
Jesus, they assume their words communicate, however poorly, something of the Gospel.
With this point Van Til would surely agree. But note one of the presuppositions of the
work of the evangelist. If the unbeliever’s knowledge and world view were wholly and
completely evil and erroneous, containing no dimension of truth whatsoever, then
communication between evangelist and unbeliever would be impossible in every
circumstance whatsoever.17 Communication with words, or with any other medium,
requires at least some shared vocabulary and some overlap in that penumbra of
contextual knowledge that impacts the meaning of each sentence that we say or think.
Again, Van Til would agree, so far as I can tell.
Therefore, one of the presuppositions of any evangelism that uses words is the
partial truth and goodness of the unbeliever’s knowledge and understanding. Of course,
this is not the only presupposition. Van Til would likely remind us that the sinner can
only be saved when the Holy Spirit works to remove the scales from the unbeliever’s
mind and unites that unbeliever to Jesus Christ. I would strongly agree with Van Til.
But these are logically separate issues. The work of the Holy Spirit does not negate the
Evangelist’s presupposition that the unbeliever’s knowledge and understanding has a
partial truth and goodness. The same would apply to evangelism using other media as
well, such as the “good deeds” of the evangelist or such as “enacting” the message in
dance or liturgy. I hasten to add that God could, and probably sometimes does, convert
the sinner “out of the blue” without using any “means.” But as the Bible says (I Cor.
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1:21), God chose the foolishness of preaching as the normal means of communicating
the salvation that Christ won on the Cross.
Let me summarize our conclusions so far in two short paragraphs:
The unbeliever’s knowledge is systematically corrupted by sin and error. The
non-Christian cannot make even a single sentence that is free from error. Everything
the non-Christian knows is wrong.
The unbeliever’s knowledge systematically and in every part is permeated by truth
and goodness. Any human’s knowledge and language, considered as systematic wholes,
must express some dimension of truth. Everything the non-Christian knows is true.
—————
It is theoretically possible for someone to argue that the sinner’s knowledge is
permeated in every part by both truth and error, both goodness and evil, both insight
and blindness while at the same time holding that the Christian’s knowledge is different.
The Christian’s knowledge is unambiguously good and free from the systematic distortion
of the sinner’s knowledge. Such a claim might be possible, but as a matter of fact, I
don’t know anyone who would make it. Neither Van Til nor I would affirm it. Rather,
Christian theologians of every stripe would likely cling to some version of the opposing
thesis. Let’s formulate the opposing thesis this way: The Christian’s knowledge, like
that of the unbeliever, is both systematically corrupted by sin everywhere and yet
permeated by truth in every part.
If everyone agrees with this, then why discuss it? The answer is that there is a
difference between merely acknowledging the limits of Christian knowledge and really
stressing it. This difference of emphasis can cascade into divergent theologies — and
even into divergent forms of Christian life.
The claim that the Christian’s knowledge is at once true and false parallels the
Lutheran claim that the Christian is at once saint and sinner. Thus what applies to
non-believers applies to Christians as well. Of course becoming a Christian changes
things. But I can see no evidence that becoming a Christian gives us perfect knowledge,
at least not in this life. We see through a glass darkly.18
Frame made an important criticism of Van Til precisely on this point. Frame
noted that while the Bible teaches that the evidence for God’s goodness, both in nature
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and in Scripture, is perfectly clear, our arguments and theological deductions from that
evidence do not necessarily possess that same perfect clarity. According to Frame, Van
Til tends to extend the clarity and certainty of the evidence for God’s goodness to
claims about our Christian apprehension of that evidence and to our Christian arguments
from that evidence.19 It would be a small step, then, for Van Til or his followers to move
to the further conclusion that there is a fundamental epistemological difference between
the non-Christian and the Christian. The non-Christian’s knowledge, life, and worldview
being corrupted by sin, and the Christian’s being free from ambiguity. I am not saying
that Van Til himself makes such a claim. I am only saying that it is a very small step
from what he does say to that further claim.
I agree with Frame on the importance of distinguishing (A) between the authority,
clarity, and certainty of the evidence that God has given us about himself and (B) our
theological deductions made on the basis of that evidence. An important consequence
flows from this. The clarity and perfection of God’s revelation, both generally in nature
and specifically in the biblical records, do not in themselves guarantee the clarity and
perfection of Christian doctrine or life. Thus whatever the distinction between Christian
and non-Christian, it does not extend to the systematic exclusion of sin and error from
the Christian’s life or theology.20
Here I want to make a very concrete point about Van Til’s theology. Given that our
analysis so far is correct, it follows that the application of Van Til’s method of antithesis
is always dangerous. I am not saying it is wrong. I am only insisting that we must be
extremely careful. Yes, the non-Christian’s knowledge and life are “wrong” because
they stand in opposition to God’s revelation and the Gospel. But that is not the same as
saying that the non-Christian’s knowledge and life are wrong because they stand in
opposition to our theologies, doctrines, or creeds! Our theologies do not possess the
clarity and perfection of God’s revelation. In those cases, where the non-Christian’s
knowledge disagrees with our theology, it is certainly possible that the disagreement is
with those aspects of our theology that are incorrect, inadequate, or misstated.
We hope, of course, that we have developed our theologies on the basis of God’s
clear and certain revelation. And so we also hope that our doctrines and creeds, especially
where they contradict the thinking of the non-Christian, possess truth and accuracy. It
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is not my intention to reduce Christian theology to a mere equality with non-Christian
opinion. It is our hope that when the non-Christian’s knowledge contradicts our
doctrines, it also contradicts God’s revelation on which our theologies are based. And
generally speaking I think that is the case. But it is my intention to remind us that this
is not inevitably the case. We can and do err in theology, doctrine, and ethics.
There is a fundamental tension in Christian theology. It shares in the certainty of
the revelation on which it is based, but it also shares in the ambiguity of all human
knowledge. When there exists an antithesis between the non-Christian’s “knowledge”
and our doctrines, we must have the confidence to presuppose that this antithesis is
also between the non-Christian’s knowledge and revelation. But we must be humble
enough to re-examine whether the antithesis in any particular case might not be with
our distortion of that revelation.
—————
I want to move on to the next step in our discussion. We have argued that both the
non-Christian’s and the Christian’s knowledge are mixtures of truth and error. Suppose
we accept that mixture as a fact. The next question is how to explain that fact. We
could turn first either to the element of error or the element of truth. For the moment,
let us focus on the element of truth. So here is my question: just how we might we
explain the element of truth in the non-Christian’s knowledge and life, and how can we
understand the dimension of saintliness in the church’s theologies, creeds, and life?
One explanation — the classical Reformed explanation — is to appeal to grace.
Reformed theologians refer to common grace as the source of the truth in the non-
Christian’s knowledge. Wesleyan theologians prefer to speak of prevenient grace. And
all Protestants appeal to the Holy Spirit’s role in preserving the truthfulness of the
Church’s creeds, doctrines, and theologies. This is clearly the thrust of Van Til’s argument.
I would enthusiastically and unhesitatingly join Van Til, Calvin, and Augustine in
appealing to grace. But I would add something else. I would also appeal to that autonomy
in each human heart and in each human culture that God has created and given us.
Although I promised in the introduction to defend the notion of autonomy, the
reader may well wonder just how “autonomy” suddenly popped up in the previous
paragraph. The short answer is that it has been implicit throughout our discussion. I
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will state my basic argument “up front,” and then interact at a little greater depth with
Van Til on this issue. I have argued that both the non-Christian’s knowledge and the
Christian’s doctrines contain a dimension of truth. The point is that this truth must
exist in the thinker, be a part of the thinker. This dimension of truth of course comes
from God as an unmerited gift. But at the same time, it is not alien to the thinker. It is
in the thinker. This in turn gives us one definition of autonomy. An autonomous
thinker or actor is precisely one who possesses the truth and the standards of truth as
a part of that thinker’s very existence. A similar definition applies to the realm of
culture. Of course the thinker’s existence and truth ultimately come from God, but that
does not take away from the reality of the truth’s existing in that thinker, as a part of
his or her very identity. Thus in evaluating evidence, the thinker appeals to that God-
given truth that exists within himself or herself. This applies not only to the evaluation
of evidence about the world but even to the affirmation of God’s revelation. Human
beings can affirm divine revelation precisely because they are autonomous agents who
possess within themselves the very standards of truth that God created.
This is not to say that anyone, non-Christian or Christian, ever possesses an
unsullied and pure truth. For both Christian and non-Christian, truth and error exist as
mixed together. Rather, it is only to say two things, one about the truth and the other
about the standards of truth. First, whatever truth the thinker may know — and however
partial and mixed with error that truth may be — it is the thinker’s own possession
and not anything alien. Second, when a human being evaluates a knowledge claim,
whether arising out of revelation or out of general human experience, the standards of
truth are never alien. They are created by God within the thinker, not imposed by God
upon the thinker from the outside.
—————
Exactly what Van Til would make of my argument about autonomy, I do not
know. The general tenor of his theology moves in a different direction. Nonetheless I
think I can flesh out my argument while remaining in close conversation with him.
Van Til claimed that Western intellectual history exhibits a pattern of unstable
oscillation between Rationalism and Irrationalism. By rationalism, he has in mind the
appeal to self-explanatory universal truths or principles, to timeless truths that can be
102
キリストと世界　第９号（1999年）
apprehended by unaided human reason, and the like. By irrationalism, Van Til has in
mind the appeal to what might be called brute facts, mere chance, chaos, randomness,
inexplicable basic laws, and the like.
In the dialectic between brute facts and systematic explanations, an over-emphasis
on system and abstract order may be described as rationalistic, while an over-emphasis
on independent facts may be described as irrationalistic.21 Every Western theory of
knowledge in the last four hundred years has tried to balance “facts” with “interpretation,”
usually with little success. In the roughest generality (but in the spirit of Van Til’s love
of architectonic analysis), we can say that, on the one hand, the growing importance of
science in Europe and especially in the English-speaking world between Francis Bacon
and Immanuel Kant produced an emphasis on facts over interpretation — in short, the
dominance of Irrationalism. The exceptions were the mathematically inclined “Rationalists”
from the Continent such as Rene Descartes who searched for absolutely certain ideas
that stood prior to our experience. On the other hand, we can say that from Kant to our
own time, Western culture has emphasized interpretation over facts. The postmodernist
claim that we can create ourselves and our world, because the facts are totally subject
to interpretation and human revision, stands at the self-defeating conclusion of this
post-Kantian trend. In other words, postmodernism pursues Rationalism to the point
of complete irrationality.
The issue first gained prominence in Kant’s philosophy.22 Kant demonstrated that
the world we perceive is a world that we have shaped. It is not that we first experience
the world and later shape or interpret it. Rather the world “comes to us” as already
shaped by our own human categories. This shaped world is fully available to human
reason for analysis and understanding. That is the Rationalist side of Kant. At the
same time, Kant couldn’t shake the conviction that there really is a world “out there”
that we shape. It exists “in itself” prior to our shaping. But we can never know that
world-out-there as it exists in itself; its existence is simply a brute fact not subject to
human reason or theory. That is the Irrationalist side of Kant. In the 19th and 20th
centuries, scholars grew ever more sensitive to the power of human beings to shape
different lived-worlds. Not only did humanist scholars gradually transform historical,
cultural, and ethical relativism into the received wisdom of the day, but in the twentieth
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century even physicists have developed a keen sense of the contribution of the human
observer to the character of the data.
Van Til’s theory of knowledge recognizes this tension between the rational and
irrational, between general principle and brute particularity, between systems of
interpretation and individual facts. The emphasis on the first half of each these three
pairs, we will call the idealist side. The emphasis on the second half, we will call the
empiricist side. Van Til believes that only in Christian revelation can we find the proper
balance between the idealist and the empiricist sides of our knowledge, between the
rational and irrational dimensions of our knowing. Van Til wants to maintain a proper
balance in his theology. That of course, is easy to say. It is far harder to achieve.
The first problem is to describe what we mean by the “idealistic” dimension in
our knowledge, and what we mean by the “empiricist” dimension of our knowledge.
Van Til does not, so far as I am aware, explore this issue in depth. So I would like to
offer my own suggestion. This brings us back to the rather dull issues in the philosophy
of language. But much hangs on the outcome.
In the case of any linguistic unit (such as a word, sentence, or paragraph) we can
distinguish between its “relational essence” and its “individual essence.”23 I intend to
apply this distinction between the relational and individual essence not only to “the
level of meaning” but also to the “level of truth.”
The relational essence of a concept (or sentence) refers to what we have called the
contextual dimension of meaning. Previously we gave the example of “The sun also
rises,” which we called sentence S. Both the meaning and truth of S will be linked to
many other claims, propositions, and definitions. When we move from an earth-centered
to a sun-centered cosmology, S changes from a factual claim about what-is-the-case to a
metaphor extending only to how-the-world-appears-to-us. It is of the essence of S to
have these relations, and neither its meaning nor its truth can be established apart
from them. In other words, change these relations and you change the meaning and the
truth of S. This is why we use the phrase relational essence. This is also why it is
impossible to avoid the issue of interpretation. To interpret S means to chose which
context in which we will understand S, where the notion of context is intimately related
to the notion of relational essence. Thus, different interpretations imply different contexts
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and thus different relational essences; and this in turn implies different meanings and
truth-values for S. That is, providing an interpretation of S is a necessary condition for
establishing the meaning and truth of S.
But this is only part of the story. There is also a “brutish factuality” about the sun,
the earth, and which goes around which. At a purely abstract level, it is completely
possible that God could have made the sun go around the earth or the earth go around
the sun. But God made his decision, so at a concrete level, it is one way or the other.
That is, the truth of S (“The sun also rises”) depends in part on its relations to other
sentences. But only in part. At some point, the truth of S also depends on what is the
case, on the brute facts of how the earth and sun actually move. Here “brutish factuality”
has positive connotation. Thus the meaning and truth of S also depends on this
particularity, this brutish fact, and this specificity. I use the term “individual essence”
to refer to this particularity insofar as the meaning and truth of S depend on it.
The notions of individual and relational essences require each other. Neither can
exist apart from the other. (A) On the one hand, if S had only its relational essence,
then its meaning and truth would depend only on its relations with other sentences.
Those other sentences would depend on still other sentences in an infinitely cascading
complexity. We could not know one thing, such as “The sun also rises,” without knowing
all things. In fact, the idealists claimed exactly that: namely, to know a single fact, we
must know the whole universe. They held that view precisely because they recognized
only the relational essence of any sentence. Van Til wanted very much to avoid that
side of idealism. He insisted that we do possess an adequate understanding of many
things without understanding everything.24 It is the individual essence of S that allows
us to understand S without the need to understand every other detail of the universe.
(B) On the other hand, if S had only its individual essence, then its meaning and truth
would have no connection with anything other than itself. Each sentence would be an
isolated “linguistic monad.” As we have already seen, however, this is not the case.
Even our brief and casual examination of S showed us the many ways in which the
sentence, “The sun also rises,” is embedded in a larger context. But Van Til would
probably focus on the theological issue at stake — namely, the larger context for S
includes God’s creation of both the earth and the sun. Indeed, divine creation is part of
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the relational essence of every sentence about the world. It follows that denying or
ignoring God’s creative activity would change the very meaning and truth of every
sentence. We may conclude that if a sentence had only an individual essence, it would
be an isolated “linguistic monad” whose meaning and truth had no inherent connection
with God’s creation. This Van Til very much wanted to avoid, and we can agree with him.
In sum, the individual and relational essences never exist apart from each other.
Fact and context are not two different things. Rather they are two distinct dimensions
of the meaning and truth of each sentence, neither of which ever exists without the
other. The idealist and empiricist sides of each sentence mutually implicate each other,
neither being capable of surviving on its own, so to speak.
Let me now bring this discussion of relational and individual essences to its pay-
off: the argument for a Christian doctrine of autonomy. Although Van Til wanted to
maintain a balance between the idealist/relational/rationalist side and the empiricist/
individual/irrationalist side of human knowledge, he clearly focused on the idealist
side. It is precisely the contextual dimension of knowledge that allowed him to declare
that all non-Christian knowledge is wrong. If creation by God, for example, is part of
the ultimate context of any knowledge claim, than a denial or distortion of that divine
act of creation would introduce error into all our knowledge of the world, that is, into
our insight into what-is-the-case. This systematic error would corrupt not only our
knowledge but our existence as well, because our knowledge is a part of who-we-are, a
part of our existence.
Previously I noted that the truth, and not just error, has entered into the knowledge
and existence of each human being, including both non-Christians and Christians. This
in turn supported the claim that we are autonomous. Our discussion of “individual
essences” strongly reinforces this argument. Our knowledge has an element or dimension
of brutish factuality. Of course the facts do not exist as uninterpreted; but at the same
time, the facts are far more than just a cascading series of unending interpretations.
Because of the individual essence of each item of our knowledge, we can have a genuine
knowledge of the world, even if we don’t fully understand all aspects of its context or
relational essence. This genuine knowledge is limited and is interwoven with falsehood
and error.
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Thus in the case of “The sun also rises,” our knowledge, in some ultimate sense, is
always wrong because we have distorted important elements in its context, such as its
dependence on God. But at the same time, our knowledge of “The sun also rises” also
has a dimension of truth, partly because we understand some elements in its context
correctly, but also because it has a particularity that we can grasp without grasping all
elements in its context. We see the sun, the horizon, and its motion. We look at pictures
of the earth taken from the moon. We know this earth revolves around this sun. We see
these things, we feel these things, we know these things. In short, in our knowledge of
S, the dimension of brutish factuality has entered into our existence. It is a part of who
we are.
—————
As I stated before it is hard to say what exactly Van Til would have make of our
argument for autonomy. He did hold to the existence of particular facts. It seems to me,
therefore, that he would have to affirm the role of the individual essence in our knowledge.
But I strongly suspect that he would not like the emphasis on autonomy that we have
drawn from that role. To clarify the situation, I will imagine a brief discussion. On the
one side, will be “Van Tillian.” He is a disciple of Van Til and represents his basic
thrust, but he may or may not express Van Til’s precise position. My stance will be
represented by Christian Autonomy Theorist, whose name I have chosen for no better
reason than its delightful abbreviation as “CAT.”
Van Tillian: When you say that each human being is autonomous, do you mean that
we can have true knowledge apart from God’s general or special revelation?
CAT: No, not at all. Everything is created by God. Without God, there’s no world and
thus no thinker and no knowledge. We know about that divine act of creation by
revelation, both general and special.
Van Tillian: But what if the non-Christian doesn’t know about God’s act of creation?
CAT: I assume that by “know” in this case, you mean “consciously know?”
Van Tillian: Yes.
CAT: That’s the problem. Most of our “knowing” exists in the periphery of our awareness
and not its focal point. Every sentence S has an infinitely complex relational
essence. As finite human beings, our conscious knowing can penetrate only very
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shallowly into that essence. Most of our knowledge of S’s relational essence will
remain implicit and not explicit, vague and not clear. And even our knowledge of
the individual essences of facts is more often implicit than explicit. What I mean
is that even our knowledge of the brutish element of things tends to hide in recesses
of our awareness.
Van Tillian: So you’re saying that the non-Christian could have an implicit, dim, and
vague knowledge of S’s connection with the doctrine of creation?
CAT: Right.
Van Tillian: And to that extent, his knowledge would be correct.
CAT: That is my position.
Van Tillian: But what about the case when the non-Christian explicitly denies the
doctrine of creation?
CAT: Then the non-Christian’s belief about creation is wrong, and that in turn injects
error into the rest of his knowledge.
Van Tillian: Agreed. So let’s move on to the case when the denial is merely implicit.
Suppose I accept your notion of implicit, proto-conscious knowledge. In that case,
I could image a non-Christian who has repressed the doctrine of creation at the
pre-conscious level and thus denies God without even realizing it. Wouldn’t you
agree that’s a possibility?
CAT: Yes, I agree.
Van Tillian: Well, is the non-Christian’s knowledge still wrong even though he is unaware
that he has denied God? 
CAT: Of course. When the non-Christian excludes, even unintentionally, the doctrine of
creation from his knowledge, then error will permeate all his knowledge. That is
because God’s creation of the world is a part of the relational essence of every
sentence about the world. If I get the doctrine of creation wrong, then there is
something wrong about every one of my sentences about the world.
Van Tillian: But in that case, how can you claim that this non-Christian can autonomously
come to a knowledge of the world, much less of God? What I mean is: how can
you think that someone, whose knowledge is false, can come to know the truth
through his own efforts?
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CAT: I guess I didn’t express my position very well. I’ll try again. On the one hand, I
am definitely saying that there is an element of falsity in everything that the non-
Christian knows. If you wish, I will even say that everything that the non-Christian
knows is false. But on the other hand, I’m not saying that everything the non-
Christian knows is wholly and completely false.
Van Tillian: Why not? 
CAT: For two reasons. First the relational essence is infinitely complex, as the idealists
have always known. It is surely possible for the non-Christian to correctly grasp
some aspects of that relational essence and not others. Correctly grasping some
aspects of the relational essence means that the non-Christian’s knowledge is
partly true. Just how important the “true part” and just how important the “false
part” may be, will vary from case to case.
Van Tillian: Let me interrupt. You’re saying that when I grasp a single sentence, say S,
my knowledge of S can be both true and false at the same time? 
CAT: Exactly, though I would prefer to say “partially true and partially false at the
same time.” In fact I would say that this is case with all human knowledge, all the
time — although the proportions of truth and falsity in our knowledge can vary
enormously and that variation can engender profoundly different consequences.
Van Tillian: Maybe I am getting a glimpse of your vision, even if I am far from agreeing.
But go on. You were telling me why you think that all of the non-Christian’s
knowledge is false, but that none of it is wholly false.
CAT: The other side of the equation is this. Our knowledge also has an individual essence.
Van Tillian: You were saying that the relational and an individual essences require
each other.
CAT: Right. Our knowledge, in order to be knowledge, has to have both. But the
individual essence of any sentence places the emphasis on the brutish element in
our knowledge. Things just are what they are. Of course, as your mentor Van Til
liked to argue, it is not true that things are only what they are. It is also of the
essence of each thing to be related to other things. What I want to stress here,
however, is what Van Til tended to ignore or at least downplay: namely, that it is
also of the essence of each thing to have a here-and-now “thisness” that belongs to
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itself alone. And that “thisness” is present in our knowledge about each thing.
Van Tillian: Given your vision, that’s fair enough. But how does that relate to autonomy?
CAT: Like this. Given the brutish dimension in human knowledge, something of the
truth enters into the knowledge of each human being, no matter how mixed up his
grasp of the relational element may be. This applies to his existence as well.
Because knowledge enters into our existence, it follows that the brutishness of
knowledge also enters into our existence.
Van Tillian: So it goes both ways: the brutishness in our knowledge enters into our
existence, and the particularity of things that we encounter in the world enters
into our knowledge.
CAT: So I would hold. We live in a real world of real power, and our knowledge is
about exactly this world and no other. And so our knowledge of the world has an
element of truth no matter how fouled up our interpretation of it may be.
Van Tillian: So your idea is that when the non-Christian lives in the world and knows
something about that world, there is a dimension of truth in him — in his thought
and in his very existence-out of which he can reflect on new ideas and come to
know some new aspects of the truth.
CAT: Exactly. I would go so far as to claim that it is this truth “in him” that allows the
non-Christian to respond to the Gospel, and even to evaluate the claims of revelation.
Van Tillian: But isn’t there an inconsistency in the non-Christian’s position. He denies
the very act of creation that is the presupposition of his ability to think and to
reason. So his reason is flawed. He also, of course, will deny some or all of the
other items in general revelation, and so his reason get even more entangled in
error and confusion.
CAT: Of course his reason is flawed. Part of the work of evangelism and discipleship is
to help him overcome this inconsistency. My claim is limited to this: even the non-
Christian has a dimension of truth in him, however mixed with error. While this
dimension of truth ultimately comes from God as a gift, it is also genuinely belongs
to the non-Christian and is, therefore, a part of his existence. So when the non-
Christian examines claims to truth, whether in science or religion, he can do at
least partially on the basis of the truth and the standards of truth that are genuinely
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his. The search for truth is alien to no human being, and God’s revelation presupposes
and confirms our integrity as human beings who can think, reason, and reflect. I
believe that God respects that dimension of truth and that he normally begins the
work of conversion in the non-Christian by presupposing the existence of some
truth in him.
Van Tillian: Well, that’s certainly not my view. I would prefer to say that we can examine
and come to know the truth, not because there is any truth in us, but only because
of God’s grace. Despite not having any truth or goodness in us, God graciously
gives us elements of truth and goodness and sustains them in us. Sometimes God
sustains these gifts in us only for a short time and sometimes for a longer time.
And that’s what God’s revelation presupposes — not your autonomy!
CAT: To a great extent I agree with you. Human knowledge is always tinged, not only
with truth, but also with error. God in his mercy helps us to resist that error, at
least in some cases. But what I want to stress in reply to your comment is this:
God’s grace need not conflict with the existence of truth in me. To say that I have
some truth in me does not eliminate the need for grace. What it does is to create a
place where God can work in me and with me.
Van Tillian: That still leaves me suspicious. Let me move this conversation into new
territory with two questions. The first is mostly a matter of clarification. The
second question gets to my suspicions about your position.
CAT: OK, what’s the first question?
Van Tillian: Here it is: when you say our knowledge is a mixture of truth and error,
you’re not saying that we have a mixture of beliefs, some true and others false.
Nor are you saying that our autonomy depends on our ability to begin with the
true beliefs and to weed out the false ones. Van Til wouldn’t like that.
CAT: I wouldn’t like it either. Of course, in some situations, it is helpful to separate
beliefs into ones that are (mostly) true and ones that are (mostly) false. In practical
terms the dimension of truth in some particular human belief may be so small
that we can dismiss that belief as simply false. Or the dimension of truth may be
so overwhelming that we can count the belief as simply true. This is particularly
true when we focus on the brutish side of our beliefs.
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But… Van Til and I are not talking only at the level of practical judgments, but
we are also talking at the level of principle. I hold that there is a dimension of truth
and a dimension of falsity in a single belief (about the world), even if for some practical
purposes we can ignore a small element of falsity or a small element of truth.
Van Tillian: You’ve been talking about the brutish side of our beliefs. What about when
we focus on the idealist side of our beliefs? Can we still say that a single belief, a
single chunk of knowledge so to speak, is both partially true and partially false?
CAT: This is where Van Til is at his strongest. When we attend to the relational side of
our knowledge, we will always find at least some small dimension of error. And
that error can sometimes have enormous practical consequences.
Van Tillian: I’m not following you. Could you give an illustration.
CAT: OK. Consider this sentence: “The human heart pumps blood.” Part of the relational
essence of that sentence, of its proper interpretation, is that God created that heart.
The creation is part of the very meaning of “The human heart pumps blood.”
That’s why I talk about the relational essence. Thus, when a non-Christian denies
the creation, his knowledge of the human biological heart is partially incorrect.
Van Tillian: So you agree with Van Til in denying the more common understanding.
CAT: What do you mean by “the more common understanding?” 
Van Tillian: Most people would say that the non-Christian can have a true knowledge
of a completely independent fact — namely, that the heart pumps blood. The
mistake comes only when he denies the additional fact that God has created the
heart. These are two independent claims. He can be completely right about one of
them and completely wrong about the other.
CAT: That is exactly what both Van Til and I would deny. The common understanding,
as you call it, ignores the relational essence of our knowledge. Where I may disagree
with Van Til is that I can image that this particular element of error may be less
relevant for some purposes and more relevant for other purposes.
Earlier, you asked for an example. Let me get back to my example of the non-
Christian who agrees that “The heart pumps blood” but denies that God created
that heart — or is “neutral” on its divine creation. The non-Christian’s knowledge
about the heart is partially false, where this falsity extends to its relational essence.
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But there’s more to be said. Even though the error extends to the very essence of
the sentence, nonetheless, the error can still be more or less significant, depending
on the situation. Misunderstanding the heart’s creation may have little effect on
my ability to calculate how much blood the heart can pump in an hour. But the
significance of that error will grow enormously in other contexts, such as education,
public policy, or judging what it means to be human. In these situations, the
broader context of our knowledge — the more extended aspects of the relational
essence — form the very core of the matter. In such situations, ignoring the
relational essence of a belief can cause it to function as an out-and-out lie.
Van Tillian: I am glad to hear you say that. When I hear the word “autonomy,” I first
think of the claim that human beings can and normally do have some completely
true beliefs even if they deny the existence of God. Many modern, “secular” men
and women go from there to the still more dangerous conclusion that the creation
or other aspects of general revelation have no essential role in our “public square.”
They think that the existence or non-existence of God has no relation to the truth
or falsity of our science, ethics, or politics. I see now that you would not affirm
autonomy in that sense.
CAT: Right, although I think that there are some unresolved issues about how Christians
are to live in a pluralistic society. Can we human beings, both Christian and non-
Christian, achieve a relative adequacy in some limited areas of our knowledge,
without either explicitly or implicitly affirming the existence of God and his role
in creation? But let me lay aside that discussion.
You had a second question, which is going to reveal your suspicions about me. Do
you want to bring it up now?
Van Tillian: Yes, it’s this. How would you distinguish yourself from the Thomists, who
root the Christian enterprise in both nature and grace. That in turn leads to a
doctrine of salvation by works and grace. I know you’re a Protestant. So you’d
insist on salvation by grace alone. But how do you avoid the Thomist trap —
assuming that you would consider it to be a trap.
CAT: Very good question. Let me say that I would dump everything that I have argued
for if it were to endanger the core of the Gospel. For me that core is justification
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by faith alone through grace alone.
Van Tillian: I think Van Til would share your priorities there.
CAT: For our purposes, we can say that the Thomist project has two stages. Although
I think I have a far more positive attitude towards Aquinas than Van Til did, still
I have problems with both stages.
Van Tillian: What are the two stages?
CAT: In the first stage, the Thomists teach that we can put aside questions of revelation
and develop a relatively adequate knowledge of world on the basis of what is
available to all men in nature.
Van Tillian: I think that Thomas himself would say that this natural knowledge can
even extend to a limited knowledge of God — although not enough for salvation.
CAT: You’re absolutely correct about that. In the second stage, where we move to issues
of salvation, our natural powers and natural knowledge are not enough. We need
God’s grace and his special revelation. Grace builds on nature, so to speak.
Van Tillian: Where do you see a problem?
CAT: Let’s look at the first stage. I agree with Thomas that we can achieve a relatively
adequate knowledge of the world without directly presupposing the existence of
God. Where I disagree with Thomas is this: I would hold that such knowledge is
only partially true. It is also partially false because the relational essence of that
knowledge includes the fact of its creation by God. Therefore, the non-Christian
— or even the Christian — who attempted a “natural knowledge” of the world
without reference to nature’s Creator would have a mixed knowledge, adequate
for some purposes but also false and misleading when we look at the entirety of
its relational essence.
Van Tillian: Go on.
CAT: In a way, I think that Thomas himself saw this. His proofs for the existence of
God all start from the world and work back to the existence of God. Thomas’ God
is the creator, and some of his arguments stress this. If Thomas’ arguments work
at all, it can only because it is self-contradictory to hold this “natural” knowledge
of the world and yet deny that the world has been created by God. So somebody
who knows the world but denies God lives and thinks on the basis of a self-
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contradiction, even if that person does not consciously acknowledge as much.
Van Tillian: You make Thomas sound like Van Til on this point.
CAT: I think the two of them have more in common than Van Til was ever willing to admit.
Van Tillian: What is your problem with the second stage of Thomas’ project?
CAT: At the second stage, when salvation enters the picture, Thomas adds grace to
complete nature. This seems to imply that autonomy at the level of nature can
exist without grace.
Van Tillian: I thought that was the traditional definition of autonomy, although obviously
not yours.
CAT: Maybe so. But I just now said that even on Thomas’ definition, a person who
claimed a knowledge of nature but denied its creation by God would be involved
in a self-contradiction. Thus, the fully consistent person would have to say that
his knowledge of nature presupposed God’s creation and continuing providence.
But both creation and providence are, on my view, acts of grace. Thus even the
“natural knowledge” that we have of the world presupposes God’s grace. Nature
and grace come together.
Van Tillian: Thus on your position, autonomy presupposes grace and grace works
through autonomy.
CAT: Exactly right. For me autonomy refers to that truth and those standards of truth
that exist in me and as a part of my concrete reality. Thus I can appeal to my own
reason when evaluating truth claims whether about the world or about revelation.
But at the very same time, to fully grasp my own autonomy I must grasp how all
my knowledge, my standards of knowledge, my very existence, and the world
have been created and sustained by God.
Van Tillian: And that in turn means that your autonomy presupposes and depends on
the grace of God.
CAT: You’re catching on fast to my train of argument. If you want, you could say that
the non-Christian’s autonomy is sustained by common grace. And you could say
that common grace works in, with, and under that autonomy.
Van Tillian: Anything else?
CAT: Just one thing. Let me move to the level of salvation. Unlike Aquinas I would
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stress how each item in my knowledge has a dimension of truth and a dimension
of error, just as I am at once saint and sinner. I guess that’s the Protestant in me.
Aquinas had a tendency to see nature as somehow complete in itself and only
later to be supplemented by grace. That stands in considerable tension with the
structure of his arguments for God.
Van Tillian: How so?
CAT: I think it explained it before. This tension I have in mind exists because Aquinas’
arguments presuppose that a man who knows the world would be inconsistent if
he denied the creation of that world by God. But in any case, it seems to me that
not only common grace but even special grace (or salvation) does not come after
nature and autonomy. Rather, both grace and salvation work through our autonomy.
So there is never a time in my walk with the Lord that my autonomy does not
depend on grace.
Van Tillian: Isn’t that the heresy of synergism, that my will cooperates with God’s grace
to produce salvation.
CAT: I don’t think so. I haven’t talked about the will up to now. But let’s go ahead and
apply the term “autonomy” not only to matters of reason and knowledge but to
matters of the will as well. But my position is that autonomy — including an
autonomous will — not only works with grace (that’s the cooperation part) but
works only on the basis of grace (that’s the far-more-than-cooperation part). My
complete position takes me quite beyond the heresy of synergism. At the same
time, however, my notion of autonomy means that grace doesn’t work above my
head or behind my back. Grace works in me, with me, and under me.
Van Tillian: Would you explain a little more about what you mean when you say,
“autonomy works on the basis of grace.”
CAT: Well, grace is a word with more than one meaning, even in Christian theology. I
will grant that from one point of view, creation was not an act of grace. But
repairing the effects of sin is hardly the only or even the central meaning of grace.
So from another point of view creation was an act of grace. That is, God did not
have to create anything. He created out of his boundless riches. It was an act of
divine love. And because we certainly didn’t exist before God created us, it
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follows that the creation was an act of unmerited love. A divine act of unmerited
love is, the way I see it, an act of grace. So to the extent that autonomy presupposes
God’s creation, it follows that it also presupposes God’s grace.
Now I’m going to summarize my last few comments. I’ve insisted that the truth
and the standards of truth (while created by God through grace) are truly present
in each human being. And I would further insist that each man’s will is truly his
and not God’s. It follows that when salvation comes to a man, the power by which
he recognizes its truth, and the will by which he accepts this salvation truly are
his. This is his autonomy. And yet at exactly the same time, this autonomy by
which he recognizes and accepts his salvation has its source in grace and is
sustained and preserved by grace — and by grace alone.
Van Tillian: I think I understand your position. Pardon the playful use of your own
theory, but I need to think some more before I can decide which dimensions of
your position are true and which are false.
—————
Why does Van Til, and with him most of the Augustinian and Reformed tradition,
find the notion of autonomy so disturbing? There are a number of answers. Partly they
saw it as a threat to salvation by faith alone. Partly they saw it in opposition to their
doctrine of the total depravity of man. In recent centuries, anti-Christian thinkers have
latched onto what they call “autonomy” as a club with which to bash Christians in
particular and religious people in general. Freud for example, argued that an autonomous
adult would not need any “Father Figure in the Sky” to guide his or her life. Modern,
mature, and “autonomous” adults would take responsibility for themselves. Freud
therefore dismissed traditional Christianity as a mere neurosis. Other contemporary
secularists have used the “autonomy of culture” to justify excluding religion from such
spheres of our common life as the public schools, the workplace, and the application of
the law. Van Til, and with him the Reformed tradition, rightly objects to that sort of
autonomy. But I would insist that none of that applies to the autonomy I have developed
in this paper.
In my own mind it is significant that I have been able to express my notion of
autonomy without rejecting Van Til’s theology or employing Van Til’s own method of
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antithesis against him. Rather I have developed and defended my view in the most
intimate dialogue with his theology. Yet Van Til rejected autonomy. His own most basic
explanation is that the Bible simply does not teach it. He appeals, if I may say so, to the
brutish element in our knowledge of Scripture.
For me, however, his reading of scripture seems implausible. It is easy to find
passages that seem to imply human autonomy. The fight over their interpretation,
however, is an old story, renewed with each new generation of Bible-students. Both
sides, for example, read how on Pentecost St. Peter warned and pleaded with his
listeners, thus appealing to their power of understanding and their capacity to make a
decision. Why do some see this as an clear affirmation of human autonomy and others
do not? I could illustrate the same hermeneutical dissonance in the interpretation of
many other passages. And at a different level, I see missionaries of all theological
persuasions study the culture of the people to whom they hope to transmit the Gospel
and then craft strategies that hinge on what those people already know. And these
missionaries, no matter what their theology, then appeal to the non-Christians to
accept what the Lord has done for them in Jesus Christ. Just like Peter in Acts 2:40,
they warn and plead, and they do so in more ways than Peter could possibly have
imaged. This seems to assume the autonomy of the people with whom the missionary
is working. And yet the Barthians and Van Tillians among my missionary partners
disagree. For them autonomy is, and will always remain, just another name for human
pride and sin.
How are we to explain this. Is one side smart and the other stupid? Is one side
guided by the Holy Spirit and the other by the Evil One? I don’t think so. It is, I believe,
a matter of the presuppositions (to use a favorite word of Van Til’s) with which we
approach the text and interpret our missionary experience. And these presuppositions
often reduce themselves to powerful metaphors. This brings us back to the beginning
of this paper. Van Til, despite his complex style, offers us a series of extremely powerful
metaphors that, I believe, guide his interpretation of Scripture.
At the beginning of this paper, I noted that Van Til declares that God is not only
an Absolute Personality but also a Self-contained Fullness. He claims this is the teaching
of Scripture. But is it? To me at least, the metaphor “Self-contained Fullness” sounds
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more like Aquinas than Moses, more like Boethius than St. Paul. Van Til wanted to
start with the teachings of Scripture as the presuppositions that Christians should use
to understand God, the world, and ourselves. I have tried to affirm Van Til’s insight as
sympathetically as possible by stressing that all knowledge has a relational essence. But
the fact is (to move to the brutish level of things) that we also have presuppositions with
which we approach Scripture! This is the hermeneutical circle that faces every exegete.
In my opinion, however, the circle ought to be more like a spiral. We approach
Scripture with the presuppositions of our culture, our upbringing, our education, and
our language. We then come to a preliminary grasp of Scripture. With this grasp of the
basic principles of Scripture, we re-examine at least some of our presuppositions, altering
them to accord more with God’s revelation. With our reformed presuppositions, we
return to Scripture and to greater insight. The spiral continues.
Does that mean that there are no restraints on the process of interpretation? Not at
all! I stand with Van Til, and against the majority of postmodernists, in affirming that
Scripture does have a determinate meaning and that the Bible is not endlessly plastic.
There is a brutish element in divine revelation that no amount of hermeneutical
“sophistication” can dispel. We depend on the Holy Spirit to guide us towards the
foundational meaning of Scripture, and we use the heritage of the church (believing
that the Holy Spirit has never been absent from the church) as an initial guide to
Scripture. Of course Scripture provides the final standard by which we test the tradition.
As Luther said, “It’s Scripture alone.”
Here is the bottom line. It seems to me that the notion of a Self-contained Fullness
functions in Van Til, and indeed in much of the Reformed tradition, as a presupposition
to his interpretation of Scripture. It is a presupposition derived from ecclesiastical
tradition. That does not necessarily make it wrong. Quite to the contrary, that is an
excellent reason for giving it “the benefit of the doubt” as a part of our initial understanding
the Bible. But at the same time, it still must be ultimately tested by Scripture. And I am
not at all sure that “Self-contained Fullness” will stand that test. Yes, “Self-contained
Fullness” incorporates a partial truth. That is why the idea, stated in different words
from century to century and from culture to culture, has lasted for so long. But in the
wrong context, “Self-contained Fullness” might also incorporate a significant error.
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The error consists in this: the metaphor of “fullness,” when applied to the God-human
relation, might not leave any “space” for human beings. The Bible, however, leaves that
space. In the book of Job, for example, God is not so “full” that he leaves no room for
Job to argue with him, to oppose him, or to demand an account from him. Even the
epiphany at the end of the book still leaves space for Job’s continued existence as a
servant of God, whom God will bless, and with whom he will continue to talk. In short,
when we challenge the over-application of the metaphor of fullness, we find Scripture
quite shouts out the message of human autonomy.
We mentioned earlier how Van Til’s method of antithesis may have had a negative
impact on some of his personal relations. Let me add that the doctrine of “Absolute
Fullness” may have reinforced that negative impact. Where is the “space” in Van Til’s
theology for errors or even for mere differences-one’s own or those of one’s opponents?
Whatever may have been the case with Van Til personally, I can imagine his theology,
at least at times, working itself out as follows. The doctrine of Absolute Fullness leaves
no space for human autonomy much less for human errors and mistakes in our
preaching, evangelism, and theologizing. I can further imagine the doctrine of Divine
Fullness interacting with the notion of antithesis so that you and I must either be in
complete agreement or at total war. That is, Van Til’s propensity for thinking in terms
of “systems” — unbalanced by an equally powerful appeal to the brutishness of facts
— might lead to the conclusion that apparently minor differences nearly always reveal
deeper, more sinister, more fundamental oppositions. Thus we can safely fellowship
with each other only when our agreement extends to the details of our theology. Since
there will always be some theological differences between even the most sincere of
Christians, it follows that there will always be a tendency in this tradition to fragment
into antagonistic, but virtually identical, groups.
Of course, disciples of Van Til are likely to disagree with my critique. But even
some non-Van Tillians might reject my position. I have in mind those readers who
would say “a plague on both your houses.” They might be tempted to demand a
presuppositionless hermeneutic of Scripture. We should approach Scripture, according
to such people, with no presuppositions at all. Many Protestants have yearned precisely
for such a theology. But at this point, Van Til stands with Kant, with the idealists, and
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even with postmodernism: there is no knowledge without presuppositions, without the
relational essence, to use my vocabulary. Van Til is right.
This means that theology will always be guided by key metaphors that shape
how we grasp the text and organize our doctrines. There will always be a little canon
with which we interpret the sacred Canon. This is the inevitable conclusion of Van Til’s
method, even if he would not have much liked that conclusion. The small canon consists
of those controlling metaphors that guide our understanding of the Canon. But we can
test the adequacy of those metaphors by appeal to the stability inherent in the sacred
Canon.25 But Christians can do so precisely because it has a brutish nature as Van Til
should have emphasized but did not. And we can do so because God by his grace has
given us the autonomy that allows us to examine and correct our own knowledge,
including those presuppositions with which we inevitably organize our interpretation
of God’s revelation.
Endnotes
1 John M. Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought (Phillipsburg, New Jersey:
P&R Publishing, 1995), 463 pages + xii. I would especially like to thank Prof. Nelson
Jennings of Tokyo Christian University for his comments and suggestions on an earlier draft
of this article.
2 Van Til would have preferred “analogy” to “metaphor.” None of the points that I will make
in this essay hangs on any of the typical distinctions in modern philosophy between these two
terms. And the meaning should be clear from the context. It should be noted that Van Til’s
background in 19th Century Idealist philosophy and his careful attention to early 20th Century
Continental philosophy gave him an expository style quite unlike that of the dominant Anglo-
American analytic philosophy. It would be both anachronistic and unfair to impose the
standards of Analytic Philosophy on Van Til. In my dialogue with Van Til, I will aim for clarity
but also for a sympathetic engagement with his style of theologizing and philosophizing.
3 Frame begins his presentation of the substance of Van Til’s system in Chapter Four. The
title is: “God: Self-contained Fullness and Absolute Personality.”
4 Frame, 21.
5 Frame, 59.
6 Acts 17:28. It is commonly thought that St. Paul took this phrase from the Stoic philosophers.
Van Til often takes his stand on his method of “antithesis” in which the non-Christian’s
position is rejected because it is not based on God’s revelation. Van Til has good reasons for
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his method, as we will argue. Nonetheless, it is worth emphasizing that St. Paul felt comfortable
with other, more positive methods of apologetics as well.
7 “The pedagogy of [Van Til’s] writing style is to throw a great many ideas at he reader all at
once, not pausing very long to explain any one of them. He emphasizes constantly that no
part of the system can be understood or affirmed apart from the rest” (Frame 6-7). Bracketed
matter added.
8 Van Til took pains to distance himself from the idealistic philosophy that he studied as a
young man. Nonetheless Frame quotes Van Til as saying that “we should ‘apply the method
of idealist logicians in a way that these idealist logicians, because of their own anti-Christian
theist assumptions, can not apply it,’ thus implying some level of agreement with the idealists
as to how concepts cohere in a system of thought” (Frame, 209).
9 It is my interpretation that the “total” in “total depravity” does not mean that each person is
“as bad as bad can be.” The “total” simply means that every area in our life has been affected
by sin. Thus no area is completely good or even sufficiently good to serve as a basis for
claiming acceptability before God on our own merits or on the goodness of our works. Other
than that, “total” depravity leaves open for empirical investigation the actual proportion of
goodness and evil in a particular area of a person’s life.
Some members of the Reformed tradition may disagree with me. They may be inclined to
say that we are all “as bad as bad can be” and that it is common grace alone that provides a
measure of goodness to some aspects of our activities. This is not my understanding, nor is it
the unanimous understanding of the Reformed Tradition of “total” depravity. One way to
look at the burden of my paper is to see it as an argument against the “bad as bad can be”
interpretation of “total depravity” — an argument that invokes aspects of Van Til’s own
theology of language, or at least invokes principles that are very similar to Van Til’s.
10 Frame recalls Van Til as “gracious and charming in person” (27). Yet Frame also honestly
recounts a number of extremely bitter conflicts with other scholars and pastors (e.g., on pages
97–114). One cannot help but wonder if Van Til’s commitment to antithesis at the level of
theological method did not sometimes result in an unnecessary antipathy at the emotional
and personal level to the thought and spiritual life of fellow (Protestant, Reformed, and
conservative!) Christians with whom he disagreed.
11 In contemporary philosophy, the catch-phrase for the position outlined in these two para-
graphs is “All data are theory laden.” Different philosophers work this out in different ways,
of which mine is just one, quite simple and impressionistic version. The principle itself,
however, it seems to be one of the hallmarks of postmodernism. Van Til clearly grasped this
general principle; it marked his apologetics long before it became fashionable in postmodernist
philosophy. “Another of Van Til’s recommendations for the proper use of evidences is negative:
do not separate fact from meaning… Van Til evidently believed this rule followed from his
correlation of fact and meaning, fact and interpretation… But if all facts are laden with
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meaning, then it is simply impossible to separate fact from meaning, no matter how much
we may try” (Frame 183).
12 Evangelicals, at least, have a lot riding on these apparently dull philosophical discussions.
For example, Evangelicals often want to harmonize a belief in biblical inerrancy with an
acceptance of the basic outlines of the modern scientific world view. The classical points of
conflict are the sequence of creation in Genesis, references to the sun’s standing still, etc. One
way to achieve a harmony would be to say that the biblical accounts of these matters merely
reflect the way the world appears to the observer. That is well and good if one has a prior
commitment to the truth of the modern model of the universe. But the ancient biblical authors
did not have such a scientific model of the universe when they wrote their texts. So why
should we think that they intended to present us with metaphors that describe appearances
only. And if they were talking about reality and not just appearances, then they were wrong!
We might ask Van Til at this point: Should we adjust our view of science to meet with God’s
revelation about these matters? And if so, how exactly should we go about doing that?
13 The Reformed tradition has often spoken of sin and error in the same breath, as has the
Lutheran heritage. This is not inevitable. The Wesleyans have just as commonly insisted on
separating them. In the Wesleyan understanding error can be a mere mistake and have no
connection with sin. They point to finitude as producing errors that are not sinful. To catch
their point, ask yourself this question. Was it possible that Jesus as boy made spelling mistakes
when learning Aramaic? And if so, would that make Jesus a sinner? If you can imagine Jesus
as a boy who occasionally made childish spelling mistakes but who refrained from all sin,
then you are on Wesley’s side. But that is not the issue that interests Van Til. He was not a
Wesleyan. The Reformed and Lutheran heritages even now continue to speak of sin and
error together. So I will not pursue the issue any farther in this paper.
14 To protect myself, let me note the obvious. One could of course create a degenerate system in
which each statement is false. When I claim that no system is wholly wrong I have in mind a
system that is actually used in some culture as a good faith attempt to understand the world.
Such a system would be, I would think, rather complex.
Let me now move to what may not be so obvious. Even degenerate systems are interesting in
that they still reflect some sort of truth and some sort of positive understanding of the world.
Consider this degenerate system consisting of two sentences. 1. Japan is an African country.
2. Heat turns water to ice. For us to evaluate these sentences as false requires some stability
in the meanings of each word. Completely idiosyncratic interpretations of, say, “Africa” and
“ice,” could make both sentences true. Thus even to evaluate a degenerate system as degenerate
requires a certain stability in terms and a larger truthfulness. This in turn makes the point
for which I am arguing in the main text. There is no system of human thought that totally
lacks all truth and goodness.
15 I am using “knowledge” in a quite broad sense. It includes beliefs, opinions, suspicions, guesses,
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hunches, thoughts, bright ideas, intuitions, models, metaphors, analogies, images, maps, and
all sorts of similar things. So by “knowledge” I have in mind the entire content of my thinking
and cogitating. “Knowledge,” however, does not include every aspect of my mental life. In
other words, “knowledge” is limited to items that somehow assert or presuppose or entail
some claim about “what-is-the-case.” A mere hope, for example, is not a part of my knowledge
except insofar as it requires some claim about the world to make sense.
16 Preconscious, subconscious, or semiconscious knowledge may seem dubious to some and a mere
contradiction to others. Nonetheless, I think that this is the typical state of human knowledge.
That is, I would suggest that most of our knowledge is implicit rather than explicit, a disposition
(what we would say if asked, etc.) rather than a conscious act (what we have consciously
entertained), and located in the penumbra rather than focus of our consciousness.
17 It is interesting to note that if our cognitive systems and language were false in every sense,
with no admixture of truth, we would not be aware that we had a language. And of course,
we could never say, either to ourselves or others, that we had a language. And we could
never say, either to ourselves or to others, that we were conscious. But that is non-sense,
which I believe that Van Til would reject as quickly as anyone else. I would add — although
this is a far more debatable claim — that if our cognitive systems and language were false in
every sense, we could not be aware of our own consciousness. Among us humans, a fully
developed self-awareness seems to depend on the existence of a language of some sort, whether
spoken or signed or something else.
18 The Wesleyan doctrine that a sanctified Christian evidences perfect love may or may not be
correct, but Wesley himself declared that perfect, error-free knowledge belongs not to whatever
perfection God may grant us in this life, but only to what Wesley called “resurrection perfection”
in the next.
19 Frame writes: “In this discussion, it seems to me, a more careful distinction needs to be made
between evidence and argument. Van Til is certainly right to argue that the evidence for
Christian theism is clear (Romans 1:18–21; Ps. 19:1) and therefore certain… But… it is illegit-
imate for him to demand that all actual (as opposed to ideal apologetic arguments) claim
certainty for their conclusions. Rather, an apologist, recognizing that he is not presenting the
full evidential force of divine revelation, ought to be honest and admit that his argument
conveys something less than absolute certainty. Another way of making that admission is to
state that the argument is ‘probable’”(Frame 276–77).
20 Several readers of this essay protested that there must be some sort of difference between the
Christian and non-Christian. I agree completely. The difference, however, is primarily a
matter of existence and only secondarily a matter of knowledge. To say that knowledge is
secondary is not to say that it is unimportant or irrelevant. By calling salvation primarily a
matter of existence, I have in mind the actual reality of the Holy Spirit having entered into
the life of the Christian uniting that Christian in body and soul to Jesus Christ, resulting in
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reconciliation with the Father, the forgiveness of sins, and eternal life. None of this applies to
the non-Christian. Doctrine and knowledge are important in supporting and guarding that
union with Jesus. They are not as substitutes for it.
Of course, if there is a “difference of existence” between Christian and non-Christian, we
would also expect there to also be some important “differences of knowledge” between them.
For example, I would assume that the serious Christian would affirm the doctrines of Creation,
the Trinity, the Two Natures of Christ, Justification by Faith, the Historical Resurrection of
Christ, and much else as well. The non-Christian will be far less likely to accept these doctrines
as part of her belief-structure.
But one must be careful not to make too much of this. On the one hand, Satan intellectually
knows all these doctrines to be true, but he is not saved because he cannot trust God. On the
other hand, some Christians may not consciously understand these doctrines, and yet they
are saved because the Holy Spirit has united them to Jesus resulting in reconciliation with
the Father. Whatever defects in their conscious knowledge, their existence is Christian. Thus
while I affirm that the actual and concrete knowledge of both Christians and non-Christians
always has a dimension of error, evil, and perversity as well as a dimension of truth and
goodness, I would further affirm that non-Christians still differ profoundly from Christians,
first in their existence but also in their knowledge.
21 “… for Van Til the search for utterly abstract concepts represents the rationalist impulse; the
search for utterly uninterpreted brute facts represents the irrationalist impulse” (Frame, 234).
22 I have argued this point in several places. Most extensively in Speaking from the Depths:
Alfred North Whitehead’s Hermeneutical Metaphysics of Propositions, Symbolism, Language,
and Religion. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991). And most recently in “Process Thought
from an Evangelical Perspective: An Appreciation and Critique” in Christian Scholar’s Review,
XXVIII:I, Fall 1998, pp. 71–89.
23 The vocabulary comes from Whitehead’s Process and Reality.
24 Van Til “insists that our knowledge, both of God and the world, can be true, although it can
never be exhaustive” (Frame, 183).
25 In the 20th Century, the Church has taken root in nearly every culture on every continent.
That much is now a common place. What follows, however, is widely understood but seldom
put into practice. Authentic Christian theology must not only speak to its local context but
also be open to global accountability. The “we” who test the metaphors that shape any
theology, therefore, ought to include reflective Christians from around the world.
Each of these cultures will share in the human mixture of truth and error, goodness and sin
that marks all cultures. Therefore multi-cultural Christian theology will both bless and
bedevil the church. Let us turn first to an example of how this diversity might grace the
church. Given that each culture will shape the presuppositions with which its Christians
approach Scripture, we can expect a growing richness of Scriptural interpretation as scholars, pastors,
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and reflective Christians from new cultures enter the arena of exegesis. Of course, we can
also expect problems. As one way in which this new diversity will plague the church,
consider the tendency of some Christian theologians to reject correction from those outside
their own culture in the name of its “integrity,” thus revealing an undialectical affirmation of
their own culture that is unbalanced by an equally vigorous recognition of its sin.
The hope of mutual correction among Christians from these many cultures requires a mutually
accessible norm. For Protestants this can only be the stable meaning of Scripture. The stable
meaning of the Bible in turn requires not only the contextual side of knowledge, as Van Til
recognized, but also the brutishness of divine revelation, which he overlooked.
Several early reviewers of my article wanted to know if the stability of the text depended
only on its individual essence, having no connection with its relational essence. I have linked
the stability of the biblical message to its brutish nature only because Van Til overlooked it,
not because I wanted to exclude the relational essence. Here I want to make three comments.
(1) Since the relational essence will be infinitely complex, we human beings will never fully
grasp it. So our knowledge of it can change even if the relational essence itself does not. (2)
What we can know more completely is the brutish element in the biblical revelation, precisely
because the individual essence is finite and, therefore, graspable by finite minds. (3) The
relational nature ultimately consists of a pattern of connections. This pattern can remain
stable despite other changes. For example, taking the gospel to new cultures will result in the
biblical revelation establishing new links to new beliefs and new facts. Many modern Christian
theologians think that this implies that the Gospel somehow continues to grow. And in
claiming that the “meaning of the text” can grow, they seem to be appealing to something
like what I have called the relational essence of the Bible. But that is a mistake. Since the
relational essence is a pattern, the pattern can remain stable even while it connects with new
beliefs and new facts. This is why, to use traditional language, we can talk about the stability
of the biblical message even while it constantly finds new applications throughout history.
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〔日本語要約〕
オートノミー（自律性）に関するヴァン・ティル
ステパノ・フランクリン
コルネリウス・ヴァン・ティルは現代神学で興味深い位置を占めるようにな
った。知識あるほとんどの学者たちは名前は聞いたことはあるが，ヴァン・テ
ィルの信奉者の輪の外では，彼が実際に書いたものについて多くを知る者はほ
とんどいない。ところが，ヴァン・ティルは注目すべき神学者である。改革派
の教理の内容の非常に保守的なものと，それを弁護し，議論する驚くほどポス
トモダン的方法とを組み合わせた人物だからである。本稿では，簡潔にヴァ
ン・ティルの教理的内容と彼の方法論の両方を探究する。
ここでは，盧言語の性質，盪隠喩の役割，蘯キリスト教における自律性の位
置という三つの論点に集中する。盧ヴァン・ティルは言語をポストモダン的に
理解している。とりわけ，言語の意味を確立する上で「コンテクスト」と「解
釈」の役割に関してそうである。言語に関するこの面についてヴァン・ティル
が言うことのほとんどに私は同意する。しかし，言語の事実的側面も同じ様に
私は強調したい。盪ヴァン・ティルは，神学における隠喩（彼の用語は「アナ
ロジ （ー類比）」）の役割を考察するのに多くの時間と労力を費やした。ところ
が，彼が見落としたのは，私たちが聖書に取り組む際の前提を形作る文化と教
会的伝統から，私たちが得る隠喩の力強い役割である。蘯ここから，自律性の
論点が出てくる。「自律性」と言う語には多くの雰囲気，流行，仕方があって，
カメレオンのようである。ヴァン・ティル同様に，そのうちのあるものは私も
躊躇しないで拒絶する。しかし，私たちがヴァン・ティルの言語理解を訂正し，
彼が聖書に取り組む際に用いる，文化的，教会的に形作られた隠喩のいくつか
を変更するならば，自律性は神が人類にお与えになったものである，と聖書に
根ざして力強く論じることができると，私には思われる。
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[Abstract in English]
SYNOPSIS OF “VAN TIL ON AUTONOMY”
Stephen T. Franklin
Cornelius Van Til has come to occupy a curious place in contemporary theology.
Most knowledgeable scholars have heard the name, but few outside his circle of devotees
know much about his actual work. Yet Van Til was a remarkable theologian: he combined
the most conservative of Reformed doctrinal content with some surprisingly post-
modernistic methods of defending and arguing for that content. In this article, I briefly
explore both Van Til’s doctrinal content and his methodology.
I concentrate on three issues: the nature of language, the role of metaphor, and the
place of autonomy in Christianity. (1) Van Til has a post-modernistic understanding of
language, particularly of the roles of “context” and “interpretation” in establishing the
meaning of language. I accept much of what Van Til has to say about this side of
language, but I insist on equal balance on the factual or “brutish” side of language. (2)
Van Til devoted considerable reflection to the role of metaphor (or to use his term,
“analogy”) in theology. What he overlooks, however, is the powerful role of metaphors
from our culture and ecclesiastical traditions in shaping the presuppositions with which
we approach Scripture. (3) This leads to the issue of autonomy. The word “autonomy” is
a chameleon with many moods, modes, and manners. Some of these I would reject as
quickly as Van Til. But it seems to me that when we correct Van Til’s understanding of
language and alter some of the culturally and ecclesiastically shaped metaphors with
which he approached Scripture, we can make a strong, biblically rooted case for autonomy
as God’s gift to mankind.
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